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Abstract
This paper develops a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth to study the interplay
between in-house R&D and marketing expenditure. Although promotional activity is
modelled as purely wasteful competition among firms for attention, it unambiguously fosters
innovation activity of firms, and possibly, leads to faster growth. This result rests on two
premises which are consistent with empirical evidence. First, if firms incur higher sunk costs
for marketing, concentration and firm sizes rise. Second, firm size and R&D expenditure are
positively related. As a result, R&D investments per firm may even become excessive,
whereas being inefficiently low in the benchmark case without marketing. This has non-trivial
consequences for the socially optimal policy design with respect to R&D subsidies and entry
incentives.
JEL Code: O31, O40, H20, L16.
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In a world with complex and diﬀerentiated goods, the physical attributes of a prod-
uct are often diﬃcult to ascertain for consumers before purchasing it. This leaves
room for ￿rms to promote such ￿experience goods￿ by framing product charac-
teristics in accordance with consumers￿ desires. This kind of advertising is often
related to psychological and sociological aspects, like appealing to desires for social
recognition, a trendy lifestyle, and so on. In contrast to ￿search goods￿, for which
advertising provides information on existence, price, retail location etc. (e.g., Gross-
man and Shapiro, 1984), advertising on experience goods does not seem to contain
much valuable information (e.g., Tirole, 1988).1 Rather, it serves to create attention
in order to ensure that a product is on the mind of consumers when these choose
among several alternatives and thus, to increase the probability of purchase.2
This paper analyzes the interplay between marketing and in-house R&D expen-
diture in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth.3 That is, in addition to
investing in quality-improving R&D, ￿rms are engaged in a contest for attention of
consumers by promoting their products and innovations, respectively. For a single
￿rm, this means that the probability to be successfully perceived as provider of a
product of certain quality depends on the amount of marketing investments incurred
1The distinction between search goods and experience goods is adopted from the IO literature
on advertising. It is well-known that advertising spending on experience goods, which is the focus
of the present paper, is much higher than on search goods (e.g., Nelson, 1974).
2For instance, ￿rms design advertising campaigns, do market research, and train their sales
personnel in order to communicate product characteristics more successfully to potential customers.
Recently, new information technologies have allowed ￿rms to assemble, store and analyze customer
data like demographics and purchase habits (￿data mining￿). In turn, the so-created customer
databases (￿data warehouses￿) enable marketing managers to design and keep track of marketing
campaigns and to target consumers more eﬀectively than by mass-media advertising (Bresnahan,
1999). In fact, ￿new direct marketing￿ and ￿database marketing￿ are recent headlines in the fast-
growing business literature on these issues (e.g., Shepard and Batra, 1998). See also Shapiro and
Varian (1999), who provide many examples.
3The benchmark model without marketing roughly follows Young (1998).
1relative to its rivals.4 This implies that the contest among ￿rms for the attention of
consumers is a form of wasteful competition.
Nevertheless, it is shown that the relationship of marketing activity in the econ-
omy to R&D investments per ￿rm is unambiguously positive. This rather surprising
result rests on two premises. First, higher sunk costs of ￿rms for marketing fos-
ters concentration (as measured, for instance, by the sum of the shares of a certain
number of top ￿rms), and thus, leads to larger ￿r m so na v e r a g e .T h i si sd u et ot h e
assumption that ￿rms can freely enter the economy but have to cover costs incurred
for both marketing and R&D by pro￿ts from monopolistic product market compe-
tition.5 Second, the assumptions of the model imply a positive relationship between
￿rm size and R&D expenditure. That is, if a ￿rm expects its market share to in-
crease for given R&D eﬀort of ￿rms, its incentive to invest in R&D is raised. These
two premises give rise to the following mechanism. If ￿rms increase their marketing
spending in response to an increase in the eﬀectiveness of marketing, concentration
and ￿rm sizes increase ceteris paribus. In turn, this fosters innovation activity per
￿rm.
However, total R&D expenditure in the economy is unaﬀected by higher pro-
motional activity due to the decline in the number of ￿rms. Consequently, the
implications of marketing for the economy￿s growth rate depend on the role of the
number of innovating ￿rms (which is positively related to population size and thus,
to the scale of the economy) for intertemporal knowledge spillovers, and thus, for
long-run growth. If there are no scale eﬀects with respect to growth, then marketing
spending and growth are positively related. However, in the presence of scale eﬀects,
higher technological incentives to invest in marketing may lead to slower growth.
4The terms ￿marketing￿ and ￿advertising￿ are used interchangably throughout the paper. Var-
ious notions of these terms exist in the literature. In this paper, their meaning is exclusively
con￿ned to attention-creating activities in the sense that the probability of a ￿rm to be perceived
as high-quality producer is an increasing function of its relative spending level for these tasks.
5Treating marketing outlays as endogenous sunk costs borrows from the theoretical IO literature
on the relationship between advertising and market structure (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1987;
Sutton, 1991).
2The two fundamental hypotheses for the main mechanism of the model, which
give rise to a positive relationship between advertising activity in the economy and
R&D activity per ￿rm, are supported by empirical evidence. First, empirical studies
have frequently reported a highly positive relationship between advertising expen-
diture levels (as shares of total sales revenues) and industry concentration (e.g.,
Mueller and Rogers, 1984; Sutton, 1991). Indeed, overall advertising costs are quite
sizable in many industries. For instance, according to Schonfeld & Associates (2003),
for consumer products as a whole, the U.S. advertising-to-sales ratio in 2002 was 6.7
percent.6 Thus, the frequently suggested empirical relevance of advertising levels
as important determinant for average ￿rm size and concentration in an industry is
not surprising. Second, at least in advanced countries (which are the ones primarily
conducting original R&D rather than imitating), ￿rm size and R&D expenditure
are strongly positively related (see, e.g., Cohen and Levin, 1989, and Cohen and
Klepper, 1996, as well as the references therein). For instance, as shown in Table 1,
84.7 percent of business R&D expenditure in the U.S. in 1997 have been incurred
by ￿rms with more than 500 employees. This ￿gure is not much lower if we look at
￿rms with over 1000 employees, which still account for 81.6 percent of total expen-
diture on innovation activity. In other countries, the importance of large ￿rms for
R&D activity is somewhat less pronounced. However, for most countries, about two
thirds of R&D outlays can be attributed to ￿r m sw i t hm o r et h a n5 0 0e m p l o y e e s ,
and well above 50 percent to ￿rms with more than 1000 employees.7
6For all sectors in the economy combined, the respective ￿gure was 2.9 percent. For the UK,
Paton and Conant (2001) report that the mean advertising-to-sales ratio in 1999 was 3.25 percent
for consumer manufacturing and 2.38 percent for all sectors combined. The pharmaceutical indus-
try is an example for a sector which is characterized by both high advertising intensity and high
R&D intensity.
7Note that the observed relationship between ￿rm size and innovation activity is not due to a
government bias of public R&D ￿nancing towards larger ￿rms. The share of government-￿nanced
business R&D is rarely over 10 percent and in some countries even biased to small companies (e.g.,
in Belgium, Finland and Switzerland). However, the U.S. subsidizes companies with more than
500 employees somewhat more than companies with less than 500 employees, with a share of 16.3
3Table 1: Percentages of total business R&D by large firms in selected
countries (year in brackets)
> 500 employees > 1000 employees
Australia (1996) 49.5 35.5
Belgium (1995) 63.7 51.4
Canada (1995) 65.4 55.8
Finland (1997) 70.7 56.2
France (1995) 79.6 70.0
Italy (1995) 80.2 65.1
Spain (1995) 52.0 34.7
Switzerland (1996) 69.6 58.3
United Kingdom (1997) 71.1 58.6
United States (1997) 84.7 81.6
Source: OECD (1999, Tab. 5.4.1).
Note: Only advanced countries with comparable databases are
included.What are the welfare eﬀects and policy implications of the relationship between
marketing investments, concentration, R&D activity, and economic growth? Ac-
cording to the model, welfare is basically determined by two arguments, the number
of varieties available to consumers and (for given initial quality levels) the growth
rate of average quality of these products. In absence of marketing, the presence of
positive spillover eﬀects of R&D imply that, compared to the social optimum, in-
novation activity is too low in equilibrium and the number of ￿r m si st o oh i g h . 8 In
this case, the government can implement the ￿rst-best allocation by providing R&D
subsidies together with a lump-sum tax on ￿rms. However, if we allow for marketing
activity, R&D investments and growth may even become excessive and product va-
riety too low. Hence, the optimal policy design may now require to encourage entry
(e.g., by a franchise subsidy) rather than taxing it. Moreover, although innovation
activity of ￿rms may now become excessive, R&D subsidies should be even higher
than in the case without marketing. This is because higher entry incentives not only
lead to an increase in the number of ￿rms but also to a reduction in ￿rm sizes and
thus, to less innovation activity per ￿rm.9
In sum, the analysis suggests that there are important general equilibrium inter-
actions between marketing and R&D incentives of ￿rms. Neglecting these interac-
tions may give rise to misleading conclusions regarding over- or underinvestment in
R&D and the socially optimal policy design towards both R&D and entry of ￿rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic structure of the
model and analyzes the equilibrium. In particular, it is explored whether the contest
vs. 9.2 percent of total R&D spending in 1997 (see OECD, 1999; Tab. 5.4.2).
8There is no ￿creative destruction eﬀect￿ (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992) or ￿stepping on toes
eﬀect￿ (Jones and Williams, 2000) in the model, which would distort R&D decisions towards over-
investment. This allows us to focus on the role of marketing by starting from an underinvestment
benchmark.
9It should be noted, however, that in the present model this policy design can be optimal only
in a second-best sense if ￿rms incur advertising costs. This is because advertising creates negative
externalities among ￿rms, which cannot be fully internalized without further instruments. However,
as brie￿y discussed in section 4, more appropriate measures may be politically infeasible.
4for attention among ￿rms crowds out innovation activity of ￿rms or complements
it. Section 3 compares the market equilibrium with the social planning solution.
Section 4 examines how the socially optimal policy design for encouraging R&D is
aﬀected by marketing incentives of ￿rms. Section 5 discusses the role of scale eﬀects
regarding the economy￿s growth rate for the results. The last section concludes. All
proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Model Structure
Consider an economy which is populated by L individuals with in￿nite lifetimes, each
supplying one unit of labor in each period t =0 ,1,2,... (i.e., there is no population
growth). The labor market is perfect and the wage rate is normalized to unity,




















σ > 1. xt(i) denotes the quantity of good i ∈ Nt ≡ [0,n t] consumed in period t,
whereas qt(i) is referred to as its perceived quality. The latter can be aﬀected by
marketing and R&D activities. From the perspective of single ￿rms, the outcome
of these activities exhibits uncertainty, as speci￿ed below. Firms are risk-neutral,
each producing one variety of a horizontally diﬀerentiated product in monopolistic
competition. The measure nt is referred to as the ￿number of ￿rms￿ in t and is
endogenously determined.






t (i) denotes the amount of production-related labor employed in ￿rm i ∈ Nt
at date t, i.e., unit costs are given by 1/b > 0.
Following Young (1998), ￿rms can incur (in-house) R&D labor investments in
order to improve product quality one period in advance of production.10 Moreover,
the quality as perceived by consumers also depends on the ￿rm￿s performance in a
contest for attention. For the moment, let this eﬀect be represented by a random
variable γt(i) discussed later. Perceived product quality qt(i) of variety i in any











t−1(i) denotes R&D labor investment of ￿rm i ∈ Nt in period t − 1 and g(•)
is an increasing function. Moreover,








re￿ects an intertemporal knowledge spillover eﬀect from previous investments of
￿rms in R&D.11 Under intertemporal spillover (5), if all ￿rms invest the same amount
of labor at date t−2 in R&D, i.e., if lR
t−2(i)=lR
t−2 for all i,w eh a v eﬂ St−1 = ﬂ St−2g(lR
t−2).
That is, nt−1 (i.e., the number of those ￿rms which invest in period t − 2 and
produce ￿nal output in t − 1) does not matter for research capabilities of ￿rms
in the subsequent period. This assumption re￿ects the notion of Young (1998)
that innovations of ￿rms are ￿equivalent￿ in the sense that ￿rms come up with
similar solutions to similar problems at the same time. As will become apparent,
this eliminates the feature of many endogenous growth models that the economy￿s
10As discussed in section 4 (see Remark 2), the speci￿cations in Young (1998) are diﬀerent from
those in the present model, also leading to fundamentally diﬀerent policy implications. Moreover,
Young does not consider marketing, which is the main focus of the present paper. For other
quality-ladder growth models, see e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992).
11Regarding intellectual property rights, (4) and (5) imply that innovations are proprietary
knowledge for one period only.
6growth rate depends on population size L (￿scale eﬀect￿). The role of scale eﬀects
for the results are discussed in section 5.
The number of ￿rms n0 in the initial period is historically given. Moreover, for
simplicity, assume q0(i)=ﬂ S0 > 0 for product quality of any ￿rm i ∈ N0 which







0 < κ < 1. The parameter κ is referred to as the ￿eﬀectiveness of R&D￿.
In contrast to previous growth models, ￿rms may promote their products and
innovations by incurring marketing expenditure. More speci￿cally, ￿rms engage
in a contest for attention (e.g., by framing product characteristics in accordance
with consumers￿ desires). That is, the probability of being successful depends on a
￿rm￿s advertising expenditure relative to those of its rivals. This borrows from the
game-theoretic literature on contests (Skaperdas, 1996).




t−1(i) denotes the amount of marketing labor employed











is the average amount of marketing labor in t − 1, t ≥ 1.L e tQ(•;zt−1(i)) be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable in z. The following assumption implies that, from the
perspective of a single ￿rm, an increase in marketing eﬀort relative to its rivals shifts
probability mass towards high realizations of γ. That is, the c.d.f. of the perceived
quality of a ￿rm￿s product is shifted according to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.
Assumption 1. For all γ, ∂Q(γ;z)/∂z ≤ 0.
Note that, if all ￿rms allocate the same amount of labor to advertising (i.e., if
lM
t−1(i)=ﬂ lM
t−1 > 0 for all i), no ￿rm gains compared to a situation without marketing.
Thus, the contest for attention gives rise to a ￿rat race￿ situation, i.e., marketing
creates negative externalities.
7For later use in the analysis of the impact of marketing on expected pro￿ts of













with normalization h(1) = 1.W ec a nt h e nd e ￿ne the elasticity
￿ η(z) ≡ zh
0(z)/h(z) with ￿ η(1) = h
0(1) ≡ η.( 9 )
Assumption 1 guarantees h0(•) ≥ 0 and thus, η ≥ 0.12 Throughout the paper, the
parameter η is called the ￿eﬀectiveness of marketing￿. The following restrictions on
the parameters of the model are imposed.
Assumption 2. Let (i) κ(σ−1)f ≥ 1−(κ+η)(σ−1) > 0, and (ii) κ(σ−1)f ≥
1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ > 0.
As will become apparent, the ￿r s t( w e a k )i n e q u a l i t yi np a r t( i )o fA s s u m p t i o n2
implies lR
t−1(i) ≥ 1 for all i, t>0, in market equilibrium with symmetric investments
in R&D and marketing, whereas the second (strict) inequality ensures existence of
such an equilibrium. Part (ii) ensures the analogous for a social planning solution.
There is free entry of ￿rms into the economy, with a large number of potential
entrants. At all times, ￿rms have to incur a ￿xed labor requirement f>0 prior to
production, which may be thought of being related to red tape or the organization
of production. Note that, as f h a st ob ei n c u r r e de a c hp e r i o da n dt h ei n t e r t e m p o r a l
spillover eﬀect cannot be appropriated by ￿rms, each ￿rm￿s planning horizon is
exactly one period in advance (Young, 1998). In t − 1,e a c h￿rm i ∈ Nt (producing
￿nal output in period t) issues bonds or shares in a perfect ￿nancial market in order







v(γ)dQ(γ;z) is nondecreasing in z for any nondecreasing function v :
Γ → R (see, e.g., Athey, 2000).
82.2 General Equilibrium
The representative consumer￿s budget constraint in period t ≥ 0 reads13
At+1 =( 1+rt)At + L − Et, (10)
where At denotes the value of asset holdings in t, Et is consumption expenditure,
and rt is the interest rate between t − 1 and t.
Maximization of utility (1), (2) subject to (10) implies that consumption spend-
ing evolves according to Euler equation
Et =( 1+rt)ρEt−1, (11)



























is de￿ned in a way that the CES-index Ct,d e ￿ned in (2), equals real consumption
expenditure in period t,i . e . ,w eh a v eCt = Et/Pt. As will become apparent, the
multiplicative form of demand functions (12), together with free entry and the sunk
cost nature of marketing outlays, imply a positive relationship between marketing
spending in the economy and innovation activity of a ￿rm.
Pro￿ts of ￿rm i in period t are given by πt(i)=( pt(i)−1/b)xD
t (i). Thus, output







13Recall wt = 1. Initial income from asset holdings (1+r0)A0 is exogenously given. In addition to
budget constraint (10), the representative consumer also has to observe both a standard transver-





(1 + rt)=0 , and non-negativity constraints,
Et ≥ 0, At+1 ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
9for all t ≥ 0 (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Provided that g(lR
t−1(i)) ≥ 1 (as will become
apparent, this is consistent with an equilibrium under part (i) of Assumption 2),
under rational expectations, at time t−1,e a c h￿rm i ∈ Nt chooses non-production
labor investments lR
t−1(i) and lM










































is expected demand of a ￿rm conditional on its investments (E is the expectation
operator).14 Next, the equilibrium concept is de￿ned (which also serves the purpose
to summarize notation).
De￿nition 1. (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a sequence {Et,A t+1,n t+1}
of aggregate consumption spending, asset holdings and the number of ￿rms, a se-
quence {rt+1,P t} of interest rates and price indices, a sequence {xt(i),l P
t (i),p t(i)}
of output levels, production employment levels and output prices of ￿rms i ∈ Nt,
and a sequence {qt+1(i),l R
t (i),l M
t (i)} of perceived quality levels, R&D and market-
ing employment levels of ￿rms i ∈ Nt+1, t =0 ,1,2,..., which satisfy the following
conditions:
(E1)G i v e n(1 + r0)A0, rt+1, nt and pt(i),f o ra n yt ≥ 0, Et, At+1 and xt(i)
maximize the representative household￿s utility (1), (2) subject to (10), i ∈ Nt.
(E2) Given Pt, Et and qt(i),f o ra n yt ≥ 0, pt(i) maximizes (pt(i) − 1/b)xD
t (i)
s.t. (12), i ∈ Nt;g i v e nPt, ﬂ lM
t−1, Et, rt and ﬂ St−1, for any t>0, lR
t−1(i) and lM
t−1(i)
maximize expected ￿rm value (15), i ∈ Nt.
14Substitute (4) in (12) and use h(z)σ−1 =
R
Γ
γσ−1dQ(γ;z) from (8) to obtain (16). Note that
each single ￿rm has measure zero (i.e., there are no strategic interactions among ￿rms). Thus, like
in the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Pt and Et are taken as given in the optimization
problem of ￿rms. In the present context, ￿rms also take average marketing employment ﬂ lM
t−1 as
given.
10(E3) Given Pt, ﬂ lM
t−1, Et, rt and ﬂ St−1,f o ra n yt>0, the expected ￿rm value (15)
of (pt(i),l R
t−1(i),lM
t−1(i)), i ∈ Nt, equals zero (free entry).
(E4) For any t ≥ 0, xt(i)=blP
t (i)=qt(i)σ−1Etpt(i)−σ/(Pt)1−σ, i ∈ Nt (goods
market equilibrium).










= L (labor market equilib-
rium).




















t−1(i)) and thus, objective function (15) is strictly
concave as function of (lR
t−1(i),l M
t−1(i)).17 Using (14)-(16) and observing symmetry
condition (E7), the ￿rst-order conditions regarding optimal R&D and marketing
















(stated as equality since we focus on g(lR
t−1) ≥ 1, and thus, lR


















15To see (E6), note that the expected value of ￿rm i ∈ Nt at date t, denoted vt(i),i sg i v e nb y
the asset market equilibrium equation rt = E(πt(i))/vt(i)+(vt+1(i) − vt(i))/vt(i), i.e., the rate of
return in the capital market (which is certain as consumers can perfectly diversify their portfolios
and there is no macroeconomic risk) equals the expected dividend yield plus capital gains. As sunk
cost have to be incurred each period, vt+1(i)=0and thus, vt(i)=E(πt(i))/(1 + rt). Finally, use
E(πt(i)) = (pt(i) − 1/b)E(xD
t (i)




16Since ￿rms are identical ex ante, the analysis focusses on symmetric non-production employ-
ment levels for R&D and marketing activities. However, note that ex post ￿rms are necessarily
dissimilar with respect to output, production employment and pro￿ts in equilibrium as demand
for their products is uncertain.
17This is ful￿lled, for instance, if h(z)=zη,d u et o(κ+η)(σ−1) < 1 from part (i) of Assumption
2.
11with equality if lM
t−1 > 0, respectively. The left-hand sides of (17) and (18) equal
the marginal bene￿t of R&D and marketing employment, respectively, whereas the
right-hand sides equal marginal costs (recall wt =1 ). If lM
t−1 = ﬂ lM
t−1 > 0,b yu s i n g









It is easy to check from (16), together with (6) and (9), that κ(σ − 1) and η(σ − 1)
equal the (constant) elasticity of expected product demand E(xD
t (i)
ﬂ ﬂ•) with respect
to R&D and marketing investments, the latter being evaluated at lM
t−1(i)=ﬂ lM
t−1,
respectively. Hence, the ratio of marketing employment to R&D employment in
any ￿rm is time-invariant, decreases with the eﬀectiveness of R&D, κ, and increases
with the eﬀectiveness of marketing, η. In a similar fashion as in Young (1998), the
following can be shown. (All results are proven in Appendix.)
Lemma 1. The equilibrium interest rate immediately jumps to a steady state
level, with rt =( 1− ρ)/ρ ≡ ￿ r for all t>0.
The absence of transitional dynamics in the model is due to the linear spillover
eﬀect in the evolution of perceived quality (4). (It is also due to the absence of
physical capital, of course.) The following result emerges.
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium). In market equilibrium, we have:













1 − (κ + η)(σ − 1)
≡ ￿ l
M, (21)
respectively, and the number of ￿rms is
nt =
ρL[1 − (κ + η)(σ − 1)]
f (σ − 1+ρ)
≡ ￿ n. (22)
12(ii) For any t>1, the (approximate) growth rate ϑt ≡ ln(ct/ct−1) of real con-
sumption per capita ct ≡ Ct/L is given by





1 − (κ + η)(σ − 1)
¶
≡ ￿ ϑ.













where Λ ≡ (σ − 1)−1 lnn0 +( 1− ρ)−1 ln
£ﬂ S0(σ − 1)bL/(σ − 1+ρ)
⁄
.
According to (24), welfare can be subdivided in two main components. First,
￿ U positively depends on the equilibrium number of ￿rms ￿ n,g i v e nb y( 2 2 ) ,d u et o
the ￿love-of-variety￿ property of preferences (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Second, ￿ U
is positively related to the (approximate) growth rate ￿ ϑ of the economy, which is
given by (23). Note that ￿ ϑ ≥ 0, according to part (i) of Assumption 2. Also note
that ￿ ϑ is independent of L, i.e., growth does not exhibit scale eﬀects, in analogy to
Young (1998).
2.3 Comparative Statics
This subsection derives comparative-static results for changes in the eﬀectiveness of
marketing and R&D, η and κ, respectively. Changes in η are of particular interest.
Since ￿ lM =0if and only if η =0 , according to (21), and since standard growth
models do not allow for marketing investments of ￿rms, η =0serves as a benchmark
case. Thus, by considering changes in η, one can examine, for instance, whether
marketing possibilities crowd out R&D investments, in turn necessarily reducing
growth, or if they complement innovation activity. In addition, changes in κ are
considered to obtain further insights regarding the interplay between R&D and
marketing incentives in the model.
Proposition 2. (Comparative-static results).
13( i )A ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee ﬀectiveness of marketing or R&D , η or κ, respectively,
raises both R&D and marketing labor per ￿rm (￿ lR and ￿ lM)a sw e l la st h eg r o w t h
rate ( ￿ ϑ), but reduces the number of ￿rms ( ￿ n).
(ii) An increase in η raises aggregate marketing employment ￿ LM ≡ ￿ n￿ lM in the
economy without aﬀecting aggregate R&D employment ￿ LR ≡ ￿ n￿ lR. Similarly, an
increase in κ raises ￿ LR but does not aﬀect ￿ LM.
(iii) An increase in η unambiguously lowers welfare ￿ U. Moreover, if η(σ−1) ≤ ρ,
￿ U is increasing in κ;i fη(σ − 1) > ρ, the impact of an increase in κ on ￿ U is
ambiguous.
Behind these comparative-static results, the following mechanisms are at work.
First, an increase in η or κ raises the incentive of ￿rms to incur sunk cost for
marketing and R&D, respectively, for any given number of ￿rms n. Thus, an increase
in κ raises the amount of researchers per ￿rm ￿ lR, and in view of (23), also raises the
growth rate of real consumption ￿ ϑ.M o r e o v e r ,￿ lM rises with η. Hence, for any n,a n
increase in η or κ has a negative impact on the expected ￿rm value. Consequently,
less ￿rms enter the economy, i.e., ￿ n declines.
This leads us to a main result of this paper: whereas it is not surprising that
an increase in η raises ￿ lM, it also unambiguously raises R&D employment per ￿rm
￿ lR.18 (Similarly, an increase in κ raises ￿ lM.) This result is driven by the following
mechanism. First, due to free entry and the sunk cost nature of advertising outlays,
an increase in η raises expected product demand E(xD
t
ﬂ
ﬂ•) of entrants (as ￿rms
rationally expect a larger market share), holding R&D eﬀort of ￿rms constant. In
turn, the expected return to R&D (which is given by the left-hand side of (17))
increases. This leads ￿rms to increase R&D investments.
As outlined in the introduction, this mechanism is consistent with empirical
18Notably, this result does not depend on the speci￿cation of g(•) in (6). To see this, note that
κ = g0(lR)lR/g(lR). Using the latter expression, (20) reveals that ￿ lR is increasing in η whenever
an equilibrium with symmetric non-production labor investments exists. (Under (6), existence of
such an equilibrium has been ensured by part (i) of Assumption 2.)
14evidence; that is, advertising expenditure seems to be a crucial determinant of con-
centration patterns, and ￿rm size is strongly related to R&D spending of ￿rms.
In turn, also the economy￿s growth rate ￿ ϑ is rising in η. As discussed in section
5, however, the impact of both η and κ on long-run growth crucially depend on
speci￿cation (5) of the knowledge spillover, and thus, on the role of scale eﬀects.
Remark 1. ( F i r ms i z ea n dR & D ) .O n em a yo b j e c tt h a tt h es y m m e t r yo fR & D
investments in the model does not allow to refer to a positive ￿rm size-R&D relation-
ship in the data. However, the symmetry assumption is merely made for simplicity
in order to study general equilibrium eﬀects of advertising in a tractable frame-
work. To see this, suppose that there are two types of ￿rms, entering the economy
in certain shares without knowing their type in advance. Suppose ￿rms diﬀer in
their research productivity and let A and B be the sets of ￿rms with high and low
research productivity, respectively. Let quality-improvements evolve according to
qt(i)=ξ ﬂ St−1g(lR
t−1(i)) for all i ∈ A and qt(i)=ﬂ St−1g(lR
t−1(i)) for all i ∈ B, ξ > 1.
(Again, we focus on g(lR
t−1(i)) ≥ 1 for all i but now neglect marketing for simplic-
ity.) One can show that this not only implies that, given both types invest the same
amount in R&D, ￿rms in A have higher demand (and thus, are larger in terms of
output or sales) than ￿rms in B, but also that ￿rms in A invest more in R&D. (In
contrast, if qt(i)=ξ ﬂ St−1g(lR
t−1(i)) for all i, then R&D investments become indepen-
dent of ξ.) From this, one can conclude that the basic property of the model that
R&D investments are positively related to ￿rm size does not hinge on the symmetry
of ￿rms with respect to innovation activity.
In order to explore how η and κ aﬀect total attention-creating and innovation
activity in the economy, aggregate employment levels in marketing and R&D are
considered next. Note that, according to part (ii) of Proposition 2, κ does not aﬀect
￿ LM and η has no impact on ￿ LR.T h i si sb e c a u s eo ft w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects which can
be deducted from the preceding results. For instance, consider the impact of an
increase in η on ￿ LR =￿ n￿ lR. On the one hand, R&D employment per ￿rm ￿ lR rises
with η. On the other hand, however, the number of ￿rms ￿ n declines with η. Under
15the speci￿cations of the model, both eﬀects exactly cancel. Moreover, since the
impact of, say, an increase in η on ￿ lM is more pronounced than on ￿ lR,w e￿nd that
η and ￿ LM are positively related. Analogously, an increase in κ raises ￿ LR.
Finally, regarding eﬃciency, both η or κ aﬀect welfare ￿ U through ￿ n and ￿ ϑ in
opposite directions. According to part (iii) of Proposition 2, the net eﬀect of a




ﬂ•) with respect to lM
t−1(i), evaluated at lM
t−1(i)=ﬂ lM
t−1,i ss u ﬃciently
low. (Otherwise, the eﬀect is ambiguous.) The impact of a higher η on ￿ U is de￿nitely
negative.
3S o c i a l O p t i m u m
Marketing activities of single ￿rms exert negative (static) externalities to their rivals.
Thus, a social planner would set lM =0for all ￿rms at all times. Before the socially
optimal policy design is discussed (in the next section), it is intriguing to compare
the market solution with the social planning optimum.
Proposition 3. (Social optimum). The socially optimal levels of R&D labor per





1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ
, (25)
l




ρL(1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ)
f(1 − ρ)(σ − 1+ρ)
, (27)
respectively. Thus, the optimal growth rate is given by ϑ
∗ ≡ lng(lR∗).
19Note that lR∗ ≥ 1, and thus, ϑ
∗ ≥ 0, according to part (ii) of Assumption 2.
16First, consider the market equilibrium in absence of marketing opportunities
for ￿rms, i.e., η =0 . As carefully discussed by Young (1998), since ￿rms can-
not appropriate the intertemporal spillover eﬀect, ￿rms underinvest in R&D (i.e.,
￿ lR <l R∗) and growth is too low in this benchmark case, compared with the social
optimum. Correspondingly, the number of ￿rms in market equilibrium is exces-
sive (i.e., ￿ n>n ∗). More generally, however, comparing (20) and (25) implies the
following.
Corollary 1. (Market equilibrium vs. social optimum). ￿ lR > (=,<)lR∗ if and
only if η(σ − 1) > (=,<)ρ.
Remember that the equilibrium R&D investment per ￿rm, ￿ lR, increases with the
eﬀectiveness of marketing η.A s a r e s u l t , i f η is high, ￿rms may even overinvest
in R&D compared with the social optimum (i.e., ￿ lR >l R∗).20 Thus, according to
(23), also the long-run growth rate may become excessive (i.e., ￿ ϑ > ϑ
∗).21 Besides
￿ lR >l R∗,a l s o￿ n<n ∗ is possible if η is suﬃciently high (compare (22) and (27)), i.e.
variety may become too low.
4 Optimal Policy Design
In view of the previous section, it is interesting to examine how the socially optimal
policy design towards R&D and entry depends on the eﬀectiveness of marketing η.
20However, recall from Proposition 2 that welfare ￿ U is always decreasing in η. For instance, if
η(σ −1)=ρ (which means that the equilibrium growth rate ￿ ϑ is at its socially optimal level), the
number of ￿rms is too low in market equilibrium, according to (22) and (27).
21Jones and Williams (2000) investigate whether a decentralized economy undertakes too little or
too much R&D in calibrating an endogenous growth model which incorporates several distortions
to R&D suggested by the existing literature. According to their analysis, underinvestment in R&D
typically prevails. In another interesting recent paper, Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2003) show that
there may be too much R&D in the growth framework of Romer (1990) if one disentangles the
market power parameter from the capital share parameter in this model. However, the authors
point out that parameter values have to be quite unrealistic to obtain excess R&D.
17Moreover, it is explored how the eﬀectiveness of R&D, κ,a ﬀects optimal policy.





t−1(i) − Θ (28)
in t−1, if it spends lR
t−1(i) on R&D labor. τ is the R&D subsidy rate and Θ > (<)0
can be thought of being a lump-sum franchise tax (subsidy), i.e., a disincentive (an
incentive) for ￿rms to enter the economy (Konishi, 1990). The total transfer to ￿rms
f r o mt h es c h e m ei n( 2 8 )i s￿nanced by lump-sum taxation of consumers, where the
government￿s budget is balanced each period.
As will be seen below, for the benchmark case η =0 ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oi m p l e m e n t
the ￿rst-best allocation under appropriate choice of τ and Θ.T h u s , i f η =0 ,i t
is suﬃcient to focus on the simple scheme (28) with two parameters. It should be
stressed, however, that the policy design for η > 0 can be ￿socially optimal￿ only in
a second-best sense. As lM∗ =0according to Proposition 3, clearly, the ￿rst-best
policy would include to ban advertising. However, this may be politically infeasible.
As a matter of fact, although economists agree that advertising on experience goods
is a waste of resources (consistent with our modelling strategy), there are little
restrictions on advertising in reality.22
Deriving the decentralized equilibrium under (28) analogously to section 2.2, one
obtains equilibrium levels of R&D labor and marketing labor per ￿rm, ￿ lR and ￿ lM,
as well as the number of ￿rms, ￿ n, as functions of policy parameters τ and Θ.I n
addition to the comparative-static results in Proposition 2 (which are still valid),
the following eﬀects of policy parameters can be derived.23
22Exceptions include advertising restrictions on alcoholic beverages or cigarettes, related to pro-
tection of young people. Generally, however, policy makers may face severe informational problems,
e.g., are unable to distinguish informative from wasteful advertising at reasonable administrative
costs. More fundamentally, general bans on advertising also seem to be in con￿ict with freedom of
speech.
23Recall that all proofs are relegated to the appendix. In appendix (see Remark 3), it is also
shown that the government￿s budget is automatically balanced under the considered tax-transfer
18Lemma 2. Under the tax-transfer scheme (28), an increase in τ or Θ raises ￿ lR
and reduces ￿ n.M o r e o v e r ,i fη > 0, ￿ lM increases in Θ and does not depend on τ.
An increase in the R&D subsidy rate τ reduces marginal costs of R&D labor,
and, thus, gives an incentive to ￿rms to raise sunk cost for innovation activity. The
net eﬀect of τ on the equilibrium number of ￿rms ￿ n is negative. An increase in Θ
raises entry costs, thus also reducing ￿ n. Moreover, as ￿rms rationally expect their
market share to increase with Θ, all other things equal, the return to R&D is raised.
Thus, ￿ lR increases with Θ. For the same reason, the amount of marketing labor per
￿rm ￿ lM is positively related to Θ. However, the R&D subsidy rate τ does not aﬀect
￿ lM, for the following reason. On the one hand, if η > 0, the two non-production
activities within a ￿rm are positively related, according to (19). As ￿ lR increases
with τ,t h i si m p l i e sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of τ on ￿ lM. On the other hand, however, an
increase in τ reduces marginal costs of R&D eﬀort relative to those of marketing
eﬀort, which has a counteracting eﬀect on ￿ lM.24 Both eﬀects exactly cancel.
Remark 2. (Relation to Young, 1998). In contrast to our ￿nding of a positive
impact of an increase of τ on ￿ lR in Lemma 2, the analysis of Young (1998) sug-
gests that ￿the provision of proportional R&D subsidies [...] will be ineﬀective (in
growth rates)￿ (p. 52). To gain insight regarding this striking diﬀerence in policy
implications, note that under tax-transfer scheme (28), the ￿rst-order condition with
































t + f + Θ. (30)









t−1 + f + Θ
. (31)
scheme when ￿nanced by lump-sum taxation of consumers.
24Note that marginal cost of R&D under tax-transfer scheme (28) become 1 − τ (replacing the
right-hand side of ￿rst-order condition (17)). Thus, replace (19) by lM
t−1/lR
t−1 = η(1 − τ)/κ.
19Eﬀectively, Young (1998) speci￿es lM
t = f = Θ ≡ 0, indeed implying that equilib-
rium R&D labor per ￿rm is independent of τ, according to (31). Moreover, using
our notation, in his model g(lR)=￿−1 ln(lR/F) (￿ and F are positive numbers) and
γt(i) ≡ 1. Thus, quality remains unchanged in Young￿s model if lR ≤ Fe ￿ ≡ ￿ lR.
The threshold amount of research labor per ￿rm, ￿ lR, which must be exceeded to
obtain positive growth is interpreted as ￿standard production ￿xed costs￿ (p. 47).
In contrast, in the present model such costs are re￿ected by the ￿xed labor require-
ment f>0 for opening up a ￿rm, as usual in monopolistic competition models. In
this case, R&D subsidies generally do foster innovations.25
Lemma 2 will prove helpful for understanding the socially optimal policy design.
Denote by ￿ lR(τ,Θ) and ￿ n(τ,Θ) the equilibrium values of R&D labor per ￿rm and
the number of ￿rms, respectively, resulting under tax-transfer scheme (28). One can
then state the following.
Proposition 4. (Optimal Policy Design). Denote by (τ∗,Θ∗) the optimal policy
design under (28). We have:
(i) If η =0 ,t h e nτ∗ = ρ and Θ∗ > 0.M o r e o v e r , (τ∗,Θ∗) implement the
￿rst-best solution, i.e., ￿ lR(τ∗,Θ∗)=lR∗ and ￿ n(τ∗,Θ∗)=n∗.
(ii) Θ∗ decreases with η; in particular, there exists a critical level ﬂ η > 0 such that
Θ∗ < 0 if η > ﬂ η. Moreover, ∂Θ∗/∂κ < (=,>)0 if and only if η(σ − 1) > (=,<)ρ.
(iii) τ∗ increases with η and does not depend on κ.
In the absence of marketing (i.e., η =0 ), since welfare basically consists of
two (endogenous) components, product variety n and the rate of growth ϑ (see
Proposition 1), two policy parameters are suﬃcient for implementing the ￿rst-best
allocation (which is characterized in Proposition 3). Since, from a social point of
view, growth is too low and variety is too high in market equilibrium with η =0 ,i t
25See Howitt (1999) for a Schumpeterian growth model, which incorporates the basic idea of
Young (1998) in order to eliminate scale eﬀects concerning the growth rate. Also in his model,
R&D subsidies imply faster growth.
20is optimal to provide a positive incentive to innovate in combination with a negative
incentive to enter the economy. In view of Lemma 2, this is reached by choosing
τ∗ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0, which explains part (i) of Proposition 4.
Parts (ii) and (iii) answer the question how the optimal tax-transfer scheme
depends on the eﬀectiveness of marketing and R&D, η and κ, respectively. In
particular, part (ii) says that allowing ￿rms to advertise their products (i.e., η > 0)
may require a regime switch in public policy; that is, if η exceeds some critical level
ﬂ η > 0, it is optimal to encourage entry (i.e., to set Θ∗ < 0) rather than discourage
it. More generally, as a high η is associated with low product variety (according to
part (i) of Proposition 2), the optimal entry tax Θ∗ should decrease with η.A st h e
decrease in ￿rm sizes triggered by a lower Θ discourages innovation eﬀort in each
￿rm, this policy response to an increase in η should be combined with an increase
in the optimal R&D subsidy rate τ∗.26
Due to the fact that κ is associated with a positive intertemporal externality
while η is associated with a negative, static one, a change in κ has quite diﬀerent
implications for the optimal policy mix (τ∗,Θ∗) than a shift in η.R e c a l lf r o mL e m m a
2 that innovation incentives can be enhanced by reducing entry incentives (i.e., by
raising Θ). From Corollary 1,i fη(σ − 1) > ρ,t h e nR & Di n v e s t m e n tp e r￿rm is
excessive from a social point of view (i.e., ￿ lR >l R∗). Consequently, in this case, Θ∗
should decrease with κ. In contrast, if η(σ − 1) < ρ and thus, ￿ lR <l R∗,t h e nΘ∗
should increase with κ. Given the optimal choice of Θ, the optimal subsidy rate τ∗
is independent of κ.27
26In order to con￿rm that τ should increase with η only if combined with a decrease in Θ,i ti s
worthwhile to consider the optimal R&D subsidy if the goverment is restricted to Θ =0 .I tc a n
be shown that the ￿optimal￿ R&D subsidy rate under restriction Θ =0 , denoted ￿ τ∗,i sg i v e nb y
￿ τ∗ = ρ(σ − 1 + ρ)/[σ − 1 + ρ(1 − κ(σ − 1))].W h e r e a sτ∗ is increasing in η, ￿ τ∗ is independent of
η.
27According to (A.29) in appendix, we have τ∗ = ρ(1 + η)/(1 + ρη), i.e., τ∗ ∈ [ρ,1). Note that
with the usual calibration of the time preference rate ρ of being close to unity, this implies that
the optimal R&D subsidy rate is quite high in the present framework.
215 Growth: With or Without Scale Eﬀects?
According to (23), the steady state growth rate ￿ ϑ does not depend on market size L,
i.e., there is no scale eﬀect regarding growth.28 This section examines the role of this
appealing property, or more generally, the role of scale eﬀects for the relationship
of the equilibrium growth rate ￿ ϑ to the eﬀe c t i v e n e s so fm a r k e t i n ga n dR & D ,η and
κ, respectively. Moreover, it is explored how the socially optimal allocation and
optimal policy design, derived in section 3 and 4, respectively, change if scale eﬀects
are present.
For instance, replace intertemporal knowledge spillover (5) by






That is, if lR
t−2(i)=lR
t−2 for all i,w eh a v eﬂ St−1 = ﬂ St−2nt−1g(lR
t−2).29 Thus, under
symmetric investments, the number of ￿rms now aﬀects average goods quality and
thus, the economy￿s growth rate in equilibrium. As the equilibrium number of ￿rms,
￿ n, positively depends on population size L, according to (22), this means that there
are now scale eﬀects regarding growth. This modi￿cation implies the following.
Proposition 5. (Modi￿ed knowledge spillover). Under spillover eﬀect (32).
(i) An increase in η reduces the steady state growth rate ￿ ϑ, whereas the impact
of an increase in κ on ￿ ϑ is ambiguous.
(ii) The socially optimal levels of R&D labor per ￿rm (lR∗∗) and the number of
￿rms (n∗∗)f u l ￿ll lR∗∗ <l R∗ and n∗∗ >n ∗, respectively.
28However, there is a positive scale eﬀect with respect to the level of equilibrium real consumption
expenditure per capita (denoted ￿ ct), since the equilibrium number of ￿rms ￿ n is positively related
to L, according to (22). (One can show that ￿ ct = bﬂ S0g(￿ lR)t￿ n1/(σ−1)(σ − 1)/(σ − 1 + ρ),w h i c hi s
increasing in ￿ n, and thus, also increasing in L.) For a more general discussion of scale eﬀects in
endogenous growth models, see Jones (1995, 1999). Actually, the title of section 5 is adopted from
Jones (1999).
29Because ￿rms cannot appropriate the intertemporal spillover eﬀect, the allocation of resources
in market equilibrium remains unchanged.
22(iii) For all η ≥ 0, the socially optimal policy under tax-transfer scheme (28),
characterized by (τ∗∗,Θ∗∗), ful￿ll Θ∗∗ < 0, Θ∗∗ < Θ∗ and τ∗∗ = τ∗. Θ∗∗ is decreasing
in η and increasing in κ.
Recall from part (i) of Proposition 2 that an increase in the eﬀectiveness of mar-
keting or R&D, η or κ, respectively, raises R&D input ￿ lR but lowers the equilibrium
number of ￿rms ￿ n. With respect to a change in κ,a sb o t he ﬀects go in opposite
directions, the impact of κ on ￿ ϑ is generally ambiguous.30 With respect to a change
in η,t h ee ﬀect through the number of ￿rms dominates under (32), i.e., ￿ ϑ decreases
with η. Note that these results are in sharp contrast to the positive relationship of
η or κ to ￿ ϑ in the absence of scale eﬀects, as implied by (23).
On the normative side, compared to the social optimum under the previous
speci￿cation of knowledge spillovers (5), more ￿rms should enter the economy (i.e.,
n∗∗ >n ∗). Again, this is because the number of innovating ￿rms now matters for
growth under symmetric investments. Correspondingly, R&D labor per ￿rm should
be lower (i.e., lR∗∗ <l R∗). For the optimal policy mix (τ∗∗,Θ∗∗),t h i si m p l i e st h e
following. First, the government should provide higher entry incentives than under
the previous speci￿cation (5) (i.e., Θ∗∗ < Θ∗). In fact, under (32), entry should now
always be subsidized (i.e., Θ∗∗ < 0 even for η =0 ). Second, there is no reason to
provide a diﬀerent R&D subsidy rate than in the basic model (i.e., τ∗∗ = τ∗). Also
note that the optimal policy responses to changes in η or κ remain qualitatively the
same as derived in Proposition 4.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined the implications of a contest among ￿rms for the attention
of consumers in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth with unrestricted
entry. Consistent with the widely-accepted view that advertising on experience
goods does not provide consumers with much valuable information, this contest has
30As shown in appendix, (32) implies ϑt = κln￿ lR +l n￿ n ≡ ￿ ϑ for all t>1.
23been modelled as wasteful competition.31
Nevertheless, it has been shown that R&D investment per ￿rm increases with
the eﬀectiveness of marketing. However, due to a simultaneous increase in concen-
tration, total innovation activity is unaﬀected. The mechanism for these results
rests on two fundamental premises, which are consistent with empirical evidence.
First, marketing activity is positively related to ￿rm size and concentration, since
marketing expenditure constitute sunk costs for ￿rms. Second, ￿rm size is positively
related to R&D activity.
The hypothesis of a positive relationship between marketing spending, R&D in-
vestments and concentration suggested by the analysis is a clear-cut empirical pre-
diction. Sutton (1991) argues that empirical models have to take into account that
both advertising ratios and concentration are endogenous variables. The present
theory not only underlines this fact, but also adds an additional link of these vari-
ables to R&D activity.32
Moreover, the model suggests a link between marketing activity, growth and
welfare. If growth does not exhibit scale eﬀects, the analysis implies that the econ-
omy￿s growth rate rises unambiguously with the eﬀectiveness of marketing. To the
contrary, if there are scale eﬀects, growth may as well decline. In any case, wel-
fare decreases due to the negative relationship between marketing expenditure and
product variety.
Finally, the proposed theory suggests that neglecting the role of marketing expen-
ditures for innovation activity, ￿rm sizes, and growth may lead to misleading policy
c o n c l u s i o n s . I th a sb e e ns h o w nt h a t ,i fg r o w t hd o e sn o te x h i b i ts c a l ee ﬀects and
advertising incentives are negligible, the socially optimal policy is to levy a lump-
sum tax on ￿rms in combination with a subsidy on R&D investments. However, if
31As experience goods tend to be highly diﬀerentiated and complex products, one may argue
that an analysis of advertising for these goods has a natural place in an innovation model.
32Although the basic mechanisms of the theory developed in this research seem to be empirically
relevant and plausible, due to potential endogeneity problems suggested by the analysis, a rigorous
empirical test has to be carefully designed.
24marketing incentives are high or if scale eﬀects regarding the economy￿s growth rate
are substantial, entry should be subsidized. Moreover, because higher entry incen-
tives reduce R&D spending per ￿rm by lowering ￿rm sizes, R&D subsidies should
increase if the eﬀectiveness of marketing rises.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. According to (4), (13), (14) and (16), average product demand,











































t>0. Moreover, as aggregate output in t−1 must equal aggregate product demand









a c c o r d i n gt o( 3 )a n d( 14). Using (A.3) and (A.4), the labor market clearing condition
(E5) implies that aggregate consumption spending is given by




for all t>0.( 11) then implies that the interest rate factor is given by 1+rt =1 /ρ
for all t>0, as in Young (1998). This concludes the proof. ⁄








25Substituting (A.3) into (A.6), using (6) and, for η > 0,a l s o( 19), and rearranging
terms proves (20). (If η =0 ,s e tlM
t−1 =0in (A.3).) To ￿nd (21), use (19) and (20).
Moreover, substituting (20) and (A.5) into (A.6), using (6), and rearranging terms
gives (22). This proves part (i). To obtain (23) in part (ii), ￿rst note that for any
two ￿rms i and j, lP
t (i)/lP
t (j)=( γt(i)/γt(j))
σ−1, t ≥ 0, according to (4), (14), and
equilibrium condition (E4). Thus, the ratio
lP
t (i)
γt(i)σ−1 ≡ θt (A.7)
m u s tb et h es a m ef o ra l l￿rms i ∈ Nt, t ≥ 0. Using (3), (4), and (A.7), for all t>0,
we have








































σ−1 =1 .) (A.7) also implies



















Recall that, in equilibrium, lR










according to (A.4) and (A.5). Combining (A.8)-(A.10) and observing both (4) and
(5) yields equilibrium levels




σ−1 σ − 1
σ
￿ E (A.11)
26for any t>0. Analogously, observing q0(i)=ﬂ S0 for all i ∈ N0,w eh a v e
￿ C0 = bﬂ S0(n0)
1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
￿ E, (A.12)
according to (2). Finally, use (A.11) and observe (6) for the second equation in (23)


















































ρt =1 /(1−ρ) and
∞ P
t=1
ρtt = ρ/(1−ρ)2 have been used for the latter equation.
Substituting (A.5) into (A.13) and observing (23) gives (24). This concludes the
proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Part (i) directly follows from (20)-(23). To prove
part (ii), note that
￿ L





according to (20) and (22), and
￿ L





a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 1) and (22). The result then directly follows from (A.14) and (A.15),
respectively. To prove part (iii), ￿rst, substitute (20) and (23) into (24). From this,








ρ − η(σ − 1)












1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ
1 − (κ + η)(σ − 1)
, (A.17)
respectively. Observing Assumption 2 con￿rms part (iii). This concludes the proof.
⁄
27P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .First, note that a social planner who does not know
the realizations of the γ0s in advance will choose a symmetric solution for R&D labor
input, i.e., lR
t−1(i)=lR
t−1 for all i,a n dw i l ls e tlM
t−1(i)=lM∗ ≡ 0, t>0.T h u s ,t h e






for all t>0, according to (E5). Moreover, as noted by Young (1998), the socially
optimal plan will also be one with immediate implementation of a steady state.
Thus, using (A.4), the resource constraint implies E(σ − 1)/σ = L − n(lR + f).
Using intertemporal welfare (A.13) together with the latter expression, one ￿nds




















Straightforward manipulations of the corresponding ￿rst-order conditions (which are
also suﬃcient for a social optimum) and observing (6) then lead to lR∗ and n∗ as
given by (25) and (27), respectively. ⁄














t−1(i) − f − Θ. (A.19)
Using (16) and (A.2), one ￿nds analogously to the ￿rst-order conditions (17), (18),

























t−1 + f + Θ, (A.22)












28Using (A.20)-(A.23) to solve for the four unknowns Et−1 = ￿ E, nt =￿ n, lR
t−1 = ￿ lR and
ﬂ lM
t−1 = lM
t−1 = ￿ lM, t>0, one obtains after some manipulations:
￿ E =
ρL(1 − τ)(f + Θ)




σL[1 − (κ + η)(σ − 1)](1 − τ)





κ(σ − 1)(f + Θ)




η(σ − 1)(f + Θ)
1 − (κ + η)(σ − 1)
. (A.27)
Observing Assumption 2, Lemma 2 directly follows from (A.25)-(A.27). ⁄
Remark 3. (Balanced budget). It remains to con￿rm that the government￿s
budget is automatically balanced if the considered transfer (or tax) to ￿rms under
scheme (28) is ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) of consumers. To see this,





.U s i n g
(14) and (A.1), equilibrium condition (E6) implies (1+rt)At = Et/σ. Advancing one
period and using1+rt =1 /ρ from Lemma 1,o n e￿nds At+1 = ρEt+1/σ. Substituting
these expressions into the budget constraint At+1 =( 1+rt)At +L−Et −Ψt, t ≥ 0,
we have Et(σ − 1)/σ + ρEt+1/σ = L − Ψt. It remains to be shown that this is
consistent with equilibrium conditions (E3) and (E5). Combining (A.2) and (A.19),


















Finally, combine this expression with (A.23) (which has been derived from (E5)) to
con￿rm Et(σ − 1)/σ + ρEt+1/σ = L − Ψt.T h i sp r o v e st h ec l a i m .⁄
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting the expressions for ￿ E, ￿ n and ￿ lR from






ρ(1 − ρ − κ(σ − 1))
(1 − ρ)(σ − 1)
¶













ln{(σ − 1)(1 − τ)(f + Θ)+ρ[(σ − 1)(κ + η(1 − τ))Θ +( 1− τ(1 − κ(σ − 1)))f]}.







κρ(σ − 1) − η [(σ − 1)(1 − ρ)+ρ(1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ)]
(1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ)(1+ρη)
. (A.30)
By substituting τ = τ∗ and Θ = Θ∗ from (A.29) and (A.30), respectively, into both
(A.25) and (A.26), setting η =0 , and observing (25) and (27), one can show that
￿ lR(τ∗,Θ∗)=lR∗ and ￿ n(τ∗,Θ∗)=n∗.T h i s c o n ￿rms part (i) of Proposition 4. To
con￿rm part (ii), use (A.30) and observe 1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ > 0 from part (ii) of
Assumption 2. Finally, as 0 < ρ < 1, part (iii) directly follows from (A.29). ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .In equilibrium, for all t ≥ 0, lR
t (i)=lR
t = ￿ lR, i ∈ Nt+1,
and nt+1 =￿ n. Thus, using (32), we have
ﬂ St−1 = ﬂ St−2g(l
R









0 )nt−1nt−2 ￿ ... ￿ n1




for any t>1. Substituting (A.31) into (A.8) and using both (A.9) and (A.10), one
￿nds that, for any t ≥ 1,








Moreover, ￿ C0 is still given by (A.12). Thus, in view of (6), the steady state growth
rate is given by ￿ ϑ = κln￿ lR +l n￿ n. Using (20) and (22), and observing 0 < κ < 1,i t
30is easy to con￿rm part (i). To prove part (ii), substitute (A.12) and (A.32) into (1)
to show that intertemporal welfare, denoted by V ,n o wb e c o m e s
V = ￿ U +
ρ2




ρt(t − 1) = ρ2/(1 − ρ)2,w h e r e￿ U is given by (A.13). Analogous

























Straightforward manipulations of the corresponding ￿rst-order conditions and ob-








ρL[1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ + ρ(σ − 1)]
f [(σ − 1+ρ)(1 − ρ)+ρ2(σ − 1)]
. (A.36)
Compare (A.35) and (A.36) with (25) and (27), respectively, to con￿rm part (ii) of
Proposition 5. To con￿rm part (iii), analogous considerations as for the derivation







[ln(1 − τ)− (A.37)
ln{(σ − 1)(1 − τ)(f + Θ)+ρ[(σ − 1)(κ + η(1 − τ)]Θ +( 1− τ(1 − κ(σ − 1)))f]}},
where ￿ u is given by (A.28). Tedious manipulations of the corresponding ￿rst-order
conditions imply that τ∗∗ = τ∗,w h e r eτ∗ is given by (A.29), and
Θ
∗∗ = −f
(1 − κ)ρ(σ − 1) + η[(σ − 1)(1 − ρ)+ρ(1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ + ρ(σ − 1))]
[1 − κ(σ − 1) − ρ + ρ(σ − 1)](ρη +1 )
.
(A.38)
By comparing (A.30) with (A.38), one can show that Θ∗∗ < Θ∗ (For this, observe
that 1−(κ+η)(σ−1) > 0 from part (i) of Assumption 2 implies 1 > η(σ−1) since
κ > 0 and σ > 1.) Finally, to con￿rm Θ∗∗ < 0, ∂Θ∗∗/∂η < 0 and ∂Θ∗∗/∂κ > 0,u s e
(A.38) together with part (ii) of Assumption 2. This concludes the proof. ⁄
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